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INTRODUCTION 
Many governments use price subsidisation (total costs less total revenues from 
user charges) to meet social protection objectives in lieu of, or in addition to, direct 
income transfers. Such subsidies may be perceived as influencing behaviour to further 
other socially desirable policies. For example, the price response induced by lowering 
the price of schooling will both lower the cost of living for the beneficiaries and also 
increase the investment in education more than a similar income transfer would achieve. 
The incidences of benefits from a general price subsidy are proportional to 
purchases and can be deduced from the pattern of expenditures. Some goods are 
inappropriate vehicles for redistribution since subsidies on them will not only accrue 
mainly to the rich they will actually increase inequality in welfare. It is therefore 
important to ensure that commodities chosen for price subsidisation are largely 
consumed by the lower income groups.  Also, detailed data on such commodities should 
be made public to make the extent of subsidy easily tractable. 
In the case of Pakistan, the problem of lack of transparency of federal and 
provincial budgets is vividly demonstrated by the inability of such budgets to readily 
highlight the subsidy on the various economic and social services, which are essentially 
in the nature of ‘private’ goods, provided by such governments. This is not only a 
reflection of the problem of the nature of budgeting practices whereby, first, revenues 
and expenditures on different heads are shown separately and no account is made either 
of depreciation of assets or the costs of capital used to finance the acquisition of assets 
which yield a stream of services. Second, to the extent that the subsidies largely benefit 
the upper income groups, political compulsions dictate that such subsidies largely 
remain hidden. 
It is clear, therefore, that one of the major areas of reform of public expenditure 
must be first to reveal the magnitude of service-related subsidies for subsequent scrutiny 
by public opinion and then to implement a policy of enhancing and improving the 
efficiency of collection of user charges to minimise the subsidy on services which are 
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consumed by the section of the population that has greater ability to pay. The higher 
revenues generated can then be used to bring down the fiscal deficit or to cross-subsidise 
the provision of services which are pro-poor. 
The objective of this paper is to quantify the magnitude of subsidies provided 
from budgetary sources on major economic and social services including irrigation, 
roads, education, health and water supply and sanitation.  This exercise is complicated 
by the limited availability of data, especially on costs of provision. Therefore, various 
approaches are adopted to estimate the subsidies.  It needs to be emphasised that in some 
cases the resulting magnitudes must be considered as approximate in character. 
The paper is organised as follows:  Section I presents the general methodology for 
deriving the magnitude of subsidy on a particular service.  Sections II to VI describe the 
procedure used for estimation of costs of provision and the magnitude of the subsidy on 
irrigation, roads, education, health, water supply and sanitation respectively.  Section 
VII brings all the individual service subsidies together to obtain an estimate of the 
overall subsidy bill.  Finally, in Section VIII are highlighted the key policy implications 
of the findings. 
 
I.  METHODOLOGY 
The costs of provision of a particular service have two components—capital and 
recurrent costs.  The former consists of depreciation of assets, which provide the service 
and the interest costs on the capital used to acquire the assets. The latter are composed of 
the salary costs of employees engaged in the delivery of the service and the overhead 
staff plus the operations and maintenance costs. 
Therefore, the total costs are derived as: 
total costs=depreciation + interest costs + salary bill + operations and 
maintenance costs    ....  ....  ....  ...  (1) 
Then, the subsidy can be computed as: 
subsidy  =  total costs—total revenues from user charges      …       …  (2) 
The analysis in the paper has been conducted throughout at constant prices (of 
1997-98). The base year corresponds to the latest year for which more reliable estimates 
are available of expenditures. The real rate of interest is computed as the nominal rate of 
interest minus the rate of inflation.  Since development expenditure is generally financed 
by borrowing, the former is taken to correspond to the average cost of domestic 
borrowing, which has averaged about 9 percent. The long term rate of inflation of 
Pakistan is about 7 percent. Therefore, the real rate of interest is taken at 2 percent. 
However, given the annual variation in these rates, we generate a range of estimates. 
The first can be referred to as a relatively high estimate in which the real rate of interest 
is taken as 2 percent. In the second estimate, interest costs are ignored. 
We turn now to the estimation of the subsidy on individual services. Hidden Subsidies 
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II.  IRRIGATION 
This is by far the most important publicly provided service, benefiting the 
agricultural sector of Pakistan.  Estimation of the capital stock embodied in the irrigation 
infrastructure is a complex exercise. Irrigation systems (including the major dams and 
water storage reservoirs) are developed mostly by the Water and Power Development 
Authority (WAPDA) and then handed over for operations and maintenance to the 
respective provincial governments.  WAPDA’s annual investments are not apportioned 
into the water and power components respectively. Therefore, annual outlays for 
developing the irrigation system are not available directly. 
Fortunately, the Federal Bureau of Statistics gives sectoral estimates of the gross 
and net national product. In the agricultural sector, the difference corresponds to the 
depreciation of the capital stock in the sector. In agriculture, bulk of the capital stock 
consists of the irrigation system, tractors, tubewells and agricultural implements. 80 
percent of the depreciation is assumed to take place in the irrigation system.  Recurrent 
costs correspond to the current expenditures of the irrigation departments of the 
provincial governments, which have been extracted from the four provincial budget 
documents and aggregated to arrive at the national estimate. Similarly, revenues from 
irrigation charges (abiana) have also been obtained from those documents. 
Resulting estimates of the irrigation subsidy are presented in Table 1. This table 
reveals that depreciation has increased rapidly in the 90s as the wear and tear on assets 
created in the 60s and 70s has risen. There is a, more or less, corresponding increase in 
interest costs. Recurrent costs, which rose rapidly in the 80s, have been held down in the 
90s probably by largely postponing operations and maintenance expenditures. In real 
terms, revenue collections have actually declined, especially in the 90s. 
The overall subsidy on irrigation is estimated at between Rs 28 billion and Rs 36 
billion in 1997-98. In real terms, it has increased annually during the 25 year period, 
1972-73 to 1997-98, by 2 to 3 percent. 
 
Table 1 
Irrigation Subsidy (Rs in Billion at 1997-98 Prices) 





Costs  Low High  Revenues Low High 
1972–73 12.2  9.8  4.3  16.5  26.3  3.8  12.3  22.0 
1977–78 11.5  9.2  3.7  15.2  24.4  2.8  12.4  21.0 
1982–83 13.5  10.8  5.9  19.4  30.2  3.6  15.8  26.0 
1987–88 14.8  11.8  7.9  22.7  34.5  3.1  19.6  31.1 
1992–93 16.5  13.2  6.3  22.8  36.0  2.0  20.8  34.0 
1997–98 23.5  18.0  6.9  30.4  38.4  2.7  27.7  35.7 
ACGR (%)  –  –  –  –  –  –  3.3  1.9 
Source:  Pakistan Economic Survey. 
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III.  ROADS 
For roads a different methodology has been adopted for estimation of the capital 
stock.  For this sector, information is available directly from the federal and provincial 
budget documents on development expenditures (corresponding to the investment).  An 
investment deflator has been used to generate the investment, It, series at constant prices 
of 1997-98.  Based on this, the capital stock, Kt, has been derived as follows: 
t t t I K K + δ − − = ) 1 ( 1   … … … … …  (3) 
Therefore, 
depreciation = Kt – i .
δ  … … … … …  (4) 
The rate of depreciation, δ, has been taken as 2.5 percent annually. 
Beyond this, the recurring expenditure and revenues (in the form of tolls and 
other charges) have been obtained directly from the budget documents. It needs to be 
emphasised that only revenues from user charges have been included. Revenues in the 
form of taxes on petroleum products consumed by transport vehicles have not been 
considered in the analysis. 
Estimates of the overall national subsidy on roads and bridges are presented in 
Table 2.  The major component of costs is recurrent costs, especially on operations and 
maintenance. In 1997-98, recurrent costs accounted for 36 percent of total costs 
(inclusive of interest costs). Revenues from tolls and other levies are extremely low, at 
below Rs 1 billion.  Consequently, the subsidy bill is high, ranging from Rs 16 to Rs 25 
billion in 1997-98. It has also grown rapidly, at almost 4 percent per annum. 
 
Table 2 
Subsidy on Roads (Rs in Billion at 1997-98 Prices) 
Total Costs 
 
Subsidy   






Costs  Low High 
Revenue
s  Low High 
1972–73 2.2  1.8  4.4  6.6  11.0  0.3  6.3  10.7 
1977–78 3.3  2.6  2.1  5.4  7.5  0.3  5.1  7.2 
1982–83 4.1  3.3  5.7  9.8  15.7  0.3  9.5  15.4 
1987–88 4.8  3.8  7.8  13.6  21.4  0.5  13.1  20.9 
1992–93 6.0  4.8  8.5  14.5  23.0  0.6  13.9  22.4 
01   1997–98  7.5  6.0  9.3  16.8  26.1  0.7  16.1  25.4 
ACGR (%)  –  –  –  –  –  –  3.8 3.5 
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey. 
Federal and Provincial Budget Documents. Hidden Subsidies 
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IV.  EDUCATION 
Education financing is a shared responsibility of the federal and provincial 
governments. The former makes grants primarily to universities (through the University 
Grants Commission) while recurrent and capital costs of primary, secondary and college 




The major involvement of governments in education is in the area of primary 
education. Since this is pre-dominantly a ‘merit good’ catering mostly to poor 
households, there is a strong case for subsidising this level of education. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the subsidy bill for primary education is large. Table 3 gives 
estimates of the government subsidy on primary education. 
Depreciation has been estimated from the series of capital stock, by application of 
Equation (3).  However, bulk of the costs are recurring in nature, consisting primarily of 
teachers= salaries and allowances.  Recurrent costs have shown fast growth after the 
mid-80s, following the launching initially of the Five Point Programme and then the 
Social Action Programme. These programmes have led to a major expansion in the 
number of primary schools and, consequently, in school teachers. As expected, since 
primary education is essentially free, revenues are negligible. 
Table 3 reveals that in 1997-98 the subsidy on primary education had approached 




Subsidy on Primary Education (Rs in Billion at 1997-98 Prices) 
Total Costs  Subsidy 




Costs  Low High  Revenues  Low High 
1972-73  0.2 0.2 4.6  4.8  5.0  0.2  4.6  4.8 
1977-78  0.2 0.2 4.5  4.7  4.9  0.0  4.7  4.9 
1982-83  0.4 0.3 8.1  8.5  8.8  0.0  8.5  8.8 
1987-88 0.7  0.6 15.4  16.1  6.7  0.2  15.9  16.5 
1992-93 0.9  0.7 19.4  20.3  21.0  0.2  20.1  20.8 
1997-98 1.3  1.0 27.5  28.8  29.8  0.3  28.5  29.5 
ACGR  (%)  – – –  –  –  –  7.6  7.5 
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey. 
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Secondary Education 
The same methodology has been used to estimate the public subsidy on 
secondary education. The derived magnitudes are presented in Table 4.  Here again, 
recurrent costs dominate, showing fast growth upto the early 80s and then some 
moderation as resources got diverted to primary education. Total subsidy on this level 
of education is estimated at about Rs 14 billion, with a relatively high growth rate in 
real terms of almost 8 percent. 
 
Table 4 
Subsidy on Secondary Education (Rs in Billion at 1997-98 Prices) 
Total Costs  Subsidy 




Costs  Low High  Revenues  Low High 
1972-73 0.2  0.2 1.8  2.0  2.2  0.1  1.9  2.1 
1977-78 0.3  0.3 2.9  3.2  3.5  0.0  3.2  3.5 
1982-83 0.4  0.3 5.0  5.4  5.7  0.0  5.4  5.7 
1987-88 0.7  0.6  10.0  10.7  11.3  0.3  10.4  11.0 
1992-93 0.8  0.6  10.0  10.8  11.4  0.3  10.5  11.1 
1997-98 0.9  0.7  13.0  13.9  14.6  0.4  13.5  14.2 
ACGR (%)  –  –  –  –  –  –  8.1  7.9 
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey. 
Federal and Provincial Budget Documents. 
 
Higher Education 
During the 70s and 80s the higher education sector expanded rapidly. Many new 
universities and colleges were established. This was an expression not only of the rising 
political influence of the urban middle class but in response also to the growing demand 
for educated manpower caused by the emergence of employment opportunities in the 
Middle East and in the expanding public sector of Pakistan. During the 90s, 
development expenditure on higher education has fallen sharply. Consequently, the 
capital stock embodied in higher education institutions, more or less, doubled by the end 
of the decade of the 80s. But since then it has actually tended to decline, implying that 
the level of investment is not even adequate for replacement purposes. 
Table 5 presents estimates of the subsidy on higher education. The subsidy may 
be somewhat overstated because, especially in the case of universities, revenues from 
fees and other charges are retained and not reverted back to the provincial budgets. But 
these collections are limited and unlikely to make a major difference to the quantum of 




Subsidy on Higher Education (Rs in Billion at 1997-98 Prices) 
Total Costs  Subsidy 




Costs  Low High  Revenues  Low High 
1972-73 0.6 0.5  2.5  3.1  3.6  0.3  2.8  3.3 
1977-78 0.8 0.6  5.9  6.7  7.3  0.2  6.5  7.1 
1982-83 0.9 0.7  5.6  6.5  7.2  0.2  6.3  7.0 
1987-88 1.4 1.1  9.8  11.2  12.3  0.3  10.9  12.0 
1992-93 1.5 1.2  8.0  9.5  10.7  0.2  9.3  10.5 
1997-98 1.5 1.2  8.5  10.0  11.2  0.4  9.6  10.8 
ACGR (%)  –  –  –  –  –  –  5.5  4.9 
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey. 
Federal and Provincial Budget Documents. 
 
The table reveals that the subsidy in real terms has actually started falling after 
1987-88. For the year, 1997-98, it is estimated at between Rs 10 billion and Rs 11 
billion.  For the twenty five year period as a whole, the annual growth rate is estimated 
at about 5 percent. 
 
V.  CURATIVE HEALTH 
Curative health services provided primarily by provincial governments consist of 
the network of basic health units and rural health centres in the rural areas and hospitals 
and clinics in the major towns and cities. Development expenditures on these services 
peaked in the second half of the 80s during the tenure of the Five Point Programme. 
Studies reveal that the major portion of beneficiaries from government curative health 
services belong to relatively poor households, while private facilities essentially cater for 
the needs of upper income households. 
The capital stock in public curative health facilities has been derived from the 
stream of development expenditures, by application of Equation (3). The value of this 
capital stock exceeded Rs 100 billion in 1997-98. Therefore, the depreciation and 
interest costs are significant, although recurrent costs are the single largest item of cost 
in this service also. 
Table 6 derives the subsidy bill on curative health.  Costs of provision increased 
rapidly upto 1987-88. Revenues are marginal, due to the low level of fees charged. 
Altogether, the subsidy bill is estimated at between Rs 15 billion and Rs 17 billion in 
1997-98, with an annual growth rate in real terms of about 7 percent. Pasha, Pasha, and Aamir  636 
Table 6 
Subsidy on Curative Health (Rs in Billion at 1997-98 Prices) 
Total Costs  Subsidy 






Costs  Low High  Revenues  Low High 
1972-73 0.4 0.3  2.4  2.8  3.1  0.2  2.6  2.9 
1977-78 0.5 0.4  3.0  3.5  3.9  0.1  3.4  3.8 
1982-83 0.9 0.7  4.6  5.5  6.2  0.2  5.3  6.0 
1987-88 1.7 1.4  9.9  11.6  13.0  0.3  11.3  12.7 
1992-93 2.2 1.8  10.9  13.1  14.9  0.3  12.8  14.6 
1997-98 2.6 2.1  13.0  15.6  17.7  0.4  15.2  17.3 
ACGR (%)  –  –  –  –  –  –  7.3  7.4 
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey. 
Federal and Provincial Budget Documents 
 
VI.  WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION 
The public health engineering departments of the provincial governments supply 
drinking water, primarily to rural households, by implementing schemes generally with 
piped connections and levy fixed charges for this service. The basic issue is whether 
these charges recover the costs of provision. 
Table 7 gives the costs of provision, revenue from tariffs and the resulting 
subsidy. The major component of costs in this service are capital costs. These have 
peaked during the 90s, because of the high priority attached by the Social Action 
Programme to the expansion of rural water supply and sanitation coverage. 
 
Table 7 
Subsidy on Water Supply and Sanitation 
(Rs in Billion at 1997-98 Prices) 
Total Costs  Subsidy 






Costs  Low High  Revenues  Low High 
1972-73 1.0  0.8  0.4  1.4  2.2  0.1  1.3  2.1 
1977-78 1.1  0.9  0.2  1.3  2.2  0.1  1.2  2.1 
1982-83 1.3  1.0  0.4  1.7  2.7  0.1  1.6  2.6 
1987-88 1.7  1.4  0.9  2.6  4.0  0.1  2.5  3.9 
1992-93 2.1  1.7  1.6  3.7  5.4  0.1  3.6  5.3 
1997-98 2.7  2.2  1.9  4.6  6.8  0.2  4.4  6.6 
ACGR (%)  –  –  –  –  –  –  5.0  4.7 
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey. 
Federal and Provincial Budget Documents. Hidden Subsidies 
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The table reveals the disappointingly low level of revenues.  Consequently, bulk 
of the costs have to be subsidised. The subsidy is estimated at between Rs 4 billion and 
Rs 7 billion in 1997-98, with an annual growth rate in real terms of about 5 percent. 
 
VII.  OVERALL BUDGETARY SUBSIDY 
We are now in a position to quantify the overall subsidy on major services, 
economic and social, which is financed by budgetary resources of the federal and 
provincial governments.  Estimates are presented in Table 8.  The high estimate includes 
interest cost. 
The analysis reveals that the aggregate ‘hidden’ subsidy was between Rs 115 to 
Rs 140 billion in 1997-98. The latter is as much as 5 percent of the GDP. The subsidy 
bill on ‘merit goods’ (that is, services which are basic and pro-poor in nature), which 
includes primary education, curative health and drinking water supply, is Rs 53 
billion, representing 38 percent of the aggregate subsidy bill. Therefore, the 
remainder, almost Rs 87 billion in unlikely to be justified on equity grounds. 
However, two positive trends are visible. The share in total subsidy of ‘merit 
goods’ has almost doubled in the last twenty five years, from about 20 percent in 1972-
73. Second, the aggregate subsidy bill has declined somewhat from over 6 percent of the 
GDP in the early 70s to about 5 percent of the GDP currently. 
 
Table 8 
Overall Budgetary Subsidy on Major Economic and Social Services 
(Rs in Billion at 1997-98 Prices) 
Economic Services  Social Services 
  Year 














  1972-73  22.5  10.7  4.8  2.1  3.3  2.9  2.1  48.4 
  1977-78  21.6  7.2  4.9  3.5  7.1  3.8  2.1  50.2 
  1982-83  26.6  15.4  8.8  5.7  7.0  6.0  2.6  72.1 
  1987-88  31.4  20.9  16.5  11.0  12.0  12.7  3.9  108.4 
  1992-93  34.0  22.4  20.8  11.1  10.5  14.6  5.3  118.7 
  1997-98  35.7  25.4  29.5  14.2  10.8  17.3  6.6  139.5 
  ACGR (%)  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  4.3 
Low Estimate 
  1972-73  12.3  6.3  4.6  1.9  2.8  2.6  1.3  31.8 
  1977-78  12.4  5.1  4.7  3.2  6.5  3.4  1.2  36.5 
  1982-83  15.8  9.5  8.5  5.4  6.3  5.3  1.6  52.4 
  1987-88  19.6  13.1  15.9  10.4  10.9  11.3  2.5  83.7 
  1992-93  20.8  13.9  20.1  10.5  9.3  12.8  3.6  91.0 
  1997-98  27.7  16.1  28.5  13.5  9.6  15.2  4.4  115.0 
  ACGR (%)  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  5.3 
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey. 
Federal and Provincial Budget Documents. Pasha, Pasha, and Aamir  638 
There exists a strong case for enhancing user charges for services that are not in 
the nature of ‘merit goods’.  Initially if efforts are made to recover recurrent costs only 
on such services (irrigation, roads, secondary and higher education) then potentially 
additional revenues equivalent to over 1 percent of the GDP can be generated. In the 
long run, if full cost recovery is targeted for then the contribution to revenues could be 
as much as 3 percent of the GDP.  Provincial governments’ fiscal position, in particular, 
could improve substantially as most of the additional revenue would accrue in the form 
of non-tax revenues to these governments. This would enable not only a significant 
reduction in the overall fiscal deficit but would also increase the availability of resources 
for financing the expanded and improved provision of pro-poor services. 
 
VIII.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In conclusion, the research demonstrates that the budgetary subsidy on major 
economic and social services is large in Pakistan at about 5 percent of the GDP. Less 
than 40 percent of this subsidy goes to ‘merit goods’. Therefore, considerable scope 
exists for improving cost recovery and raising the level of non-tax revenues, with 
much of the benefit going to provincial governments. It needs to be recognised that 
resource mobilisation efforts, which have hitherto been concentrated in the taxation 
area, need to focus more on non-taxes, by raising charges on services which are not in 
the nature of ‘merit goods’, if the overall equity consequences of public budgeting are 
to be enhanced. Comments 
 
The objective of the paper is to quantify the magnitude of subsidies provided 
from budgetary sources on major economic and social services including irrigation, 
roads, education, health, potable water supply and sanitation.  It is difficult to find 
data to carry out such studies, since hardly any data is available on the subject 
matter.  Thus, authors must have made tremendous efforts to compile the data and 
carry out the study.  Besides, there is limited literature on the subject matter which 
may have analysed the matter in so depth.  In this respect, the efforts of the authors 
need to be appreciated.  Irrespective of the quality of quantification of the results of 
the study, the authors have contributed to initiate debate on Varity of subsidies in a 
broader prospect.  Thus, the paper will initiate debate to rationalise subsidies, which 
have been granted in the past without economic rationale.       
Notwithstanding the above, the study creates an impression that huge subsidy 
is provided for the sectors mentioned above.  It is claimed that removal of such 
subsidies could provide a good support to solve budget deficit problem and therefore 
it may also help to resolve other related budgetary issues.  However, considering the 
definition and methodology used by the authors to derive the results, it appears that 
there is a need to pay due attention to properly define subsidies. No rational has been 
provided therein for the definition used to calculate the results.  The study suffers 
from such definitional and methodological limitations.  It could be improved further 
if the following comments are given due importance to revise the study. 
 
1.  There is a need to have some space allocated to review the literature on 
the subject matter so that subsidy is properly understood and it is not 
mixed up with state welfare works and services.  It will help to analyse 
the issue within the domain of debate on subsidies.  There is not a single 
study referred there in which may highlight the debate on subsidies.  Thus 
the importance of the issue is not established.  Besides, the review of 
literature is totally neglected which has led to create ambiguous definition 
of subsidies. 
2.  A major problem with the paper is that it has no theoretical foundation 
spelled out therein.  If the theory of subsidies is made a part of the paper, 
it will help to address the issue in a proper framework.  Thus, many social 
services which have been treated as subsidies may be eliminated. As a 
result, the claims and quantification may become insignificant.   
Surprisingly, no support from theory or literature has been derived.  I 
think public goods and public services which are responsibility of the 
state have been mixed up with private goods for example, roads, basic 
health, primary education, potable water and sanitation expenditure etc., M. Aslam Chaudhary  640
which may not fall in the range of the definition of subsidies.  These 
expenditures are state welfare expenditures and need not be treated as 
subsidies.  The provision of such services is a responsibility of the state 
under constitution. How these can be treated subsidies on private goods is 
not understandable. 
3.  Moreover, while discussing the results, the authors themselves ignore the 
figures for expenditures on public services. If so, then why these 
estimates are a part of the study anyway? 
4.  For a proper identification of distortions like subsidies, there is also a 
need to look at other distortions in the market.  Take an example of 
irrigation, for sure; cost of the same may be greater than revenue recovery 
from irrigation. But, what about the controlled prices of agricultural 
products (state monoposony), like cotton, rice and other cash crops.  State 
corporations bought these crops at half prices and then exported these 
commodities at double prices.  The difference (surplus) is taken away by 
the state. It had been the practice of Cotton Trading Corporate and Rice 
Export Corporation. By taking care of these aspects, do the subsidies still 
exceed the cost?, or revenue collected from the sector.  Such distortions  
have not been a part of the methodology.  Thus, the methodology use for 
calculation of subsidies can hardly be justified. Therefore, no attempt is 
made to justify these aspects to reach to net results of subsidies.  Besides, 
no rationale for the formula used to calculate subsidies is provided.  Such  
neglects led to overestimate the volume of subsidies. 
5.  On the one hand, the authors claim that objective of the paper is to 
quantify the volume of subsidies.  At the end of the paper, they claim that 
Rs 87 billion out of (Rs 115–140 billion) is unlikely to be justified as 
subsidies on equity grounds.  All ends up with net subsidies of 1 percent 
of GDP, which the authors claim that it can be raised by elimination of 
subsidies.  If the figures are analysed by separating public services and 
net subsidies, the figures may be insignificant. Besides, keeping in view 
wide spread of poverty, the position of small farmers and over 65 percent 
rural population deprived of basic public services, hardly any claim of the 
authors is justified.  Thus, there is a need to properly review the literature, 
justification of methodology need to be spelled out and there is also a 
need to capture price distortions, hidden taxes on agriculture and separate 
public services from subsidies.       
 
M. Aslam Chaudhary  
Quaid-i-Azam University, 
Islamabad. 